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COWS IN HOT WATER: REGULATION OF
LIVESTOCK GRAZING THROUGH THE
FEDERAL CLEAN WATER ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Amidst the deluge of assorted and sundry American ecological disasters, environmental impairment caused by livestock grazing is perhaps the best kept secret. Chronic overgrazing generates extensive environmental degradation of
federal lands, including more damage to wild flora and fauna,
soil, habitats, and water than any other land use.1 In particular, livestock use of the public range pollutes and ravishes
delicate riparian areas,2 which are integral to the sustained
prosperity of the rangeland ecosystem. 3 To put it mildly, the
environmental state of America's rangeland is in crisis.
4
The Bureau of Land Management [hereinafter BLM],
the federal agency principally responsible for the administration of grazing on federal lands, leases approximately 170
million acres of public land for grazing purposes. 5 In the
past, administrative reform of grazing regulations has
yielded very little meaningful change in the protection of the
public rangeland. 6 This trend has continued, as recent attempts to revise rangeland management law7 have become
1. See infra notes 31-45, 54-62 and accompanying text.

2. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
3. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC RANGELANDS: SOME RIPARIAN AREAS

RESTORED BUT

WIDESPREAD

IMPROVEMENT

WILL BE

SLOW

(GAO

REPORT)(1988).
4. The BLM is the principal federal agency responsible for the administration of grazing on federal lands. See infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
5. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR MANAGING THE
NATION'S PUBLIC LANDS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT FISCAL YEAR 1991 (BLM REPORT) at 13

(1991).

6. See infra notes 114-17, 142-44 and accompanying text.
7. "Rangeland management law" is a segment of public land law stemming
from federal legislation over the management of the public rangelands. See
George C. Coggins et al., The Law of Public Rangeland Management I: The Extent and Distributionof FederalPower, 12 ENVTL. L. 535, 536-38 (1982)[herein-

after Coggins I]. Rangeland management law has been largely ignored by the
legal community. Id. at 537. However, recent developments have led to increased attention by legal commentators. Id. at 537-38.
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mired in political controversy.8 The BLM's latest proposed
grazing industry regulations, which emphasized fee increases
and economic incentives for ecologically responsible grazing
practices, were thwarted by political opponents. 9 Most importantly, reform of rangeland management law has continually failed to address the pivotal problem associated with livestock grazing today: federal lands cannot adequately support
the number of livestock currently grazing on them. 10
Although past attempts at reform have been largely ineffective, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 1 may provide an opportunity to circumvent the political quagmire. 2
Riparian areas scourged by "nonpoint pollution sources," 13 in
this case livestock grazing, merit federal statutory protection.
Rather than promulgating new grazing industry regulations,
a highly controversial and politically sensitive endeavor, the
BLM should regulate livestock grazing through the nonpoint
pollution source provisions of the Clean Water Act. By restricting livestock access to riparian areas, the overall
number of livestock capable of grazing on federal lands will
sparing the western rangeland from
be significantly reduced,
4
desertification.1
In section II, this comment explains the ecological significance of riparian ecosystems, the damage caused to them by
8. See infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 127-38, 144 and accompanying text.
10. BLM lands tend to be "hot, dry, barren, rocky, and/or steeply sloped."
See LYNN JACOBS, WASTE OF THE WEST: PUBLIC LANDS RANCHING 23 (1991). The
severely limited amount of forage, and the large number of cattle and other
livestock that graze on these lands inevitably results in overgrazing. See id. at
31-32. In 1987, for example, 1.5 million cattle grazing on federal BLM and Forest Service lands consumed 18.2 million animal unit months. Id. at 571. An
animal unit month is "the amount of forage consumption necessary for the sustenance of one cow or its equivalent for 1 month." 43 C.F.R. § 4100.05 (1986).
11. The Clean Water Act §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988) [hereinafter Clean Water Act].
12. The last significant addition to rangeland management law was the
Public Rangeland Improvement Act of 1978. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text. Since then, Congress has failed to enact legislation to alleviate
the continuing destruction of federal lands. Alternatively, revisions to the
Clean Water Act have been more frequently and politically feasible. The 1987
Clean Water Act amendments directly addressed nonpoint pollution sources,
and new amendments may possibly be enacted this year. See infra note 294
and accompanying text.
13. "Nonpoint pollution source" is an amorphous term that evades clear definition. See infra note 150-52 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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livestock grazing, and the remarkable capability of these areas to be revitalized. 1 5 In addition, section II looks at past
and present attempts by the BLM to address the ecological
problems caused by grazing.' 6 Lastly, section II examines
source control
the legal development of nonpoint pollution
17
mechanisms under the Clean Water Act.
Section III analyzes administrative reform efforts, concluding that the primary method of achieving successful reform, namely reduction of livestock numbers, is never directly addressed.' 8 Section III also evaluates the potential
benefits and detriments of regulation of riparian ecosystems
under the Clean Water Act.1 9 In section IV, potential impediments to implementation are addressed and statutory solutions are proposed.2 °

II.

BACKGROUND

Livestock Grazing:An Ecological Disaster
Although the problems associated with livestock grazing
have been shrouded in public anonymity, they constitute the
single largest contributor to environmental degradation of
public lands. 2 1 Riparian ecosystems are especially susceptible to environmental damage caused by decreases in water
quantity and quality. 22 However, studies have shown that riparian ecosystems have an amazing capacity to rejuvenate if
left alone.2 3
A.

1. RiparianEcosystems
A riparian ecosystem is the area around a water source,
usually a river or lake.2 4 They are delicate, biodiverse eco15. See infra notes 22-62 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 78-144 and accompanying text.

17. See infra notes 145-222 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 225-49 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 250-93 and accompanying text.

20. See infra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
21. The pertinent regulatory agencies involved in the administration of the
public range acknowledge that livestock grazing is a major cause of widespread

environmental damage on federal rangelands. See infra notes 55-60, 223-24
and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
24. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 94. Riparian systems sometimes occur in ar-

eas not located near surface water, because they are sustained by slow moving
ground water trickling up to the surface. Id.
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systems that have a high water tables, but are not under
water. 25 Riparian areas are wetland ecosystems, or "ecotones," a transitional system providing both land and aquatic
habitats.2 s
Riparian ecosystems comprise only a small portion of federal rangeland, but are a vital part of the public range. 27 The
vegetation around riparian areas provides substantial benefits, including:
(1) [S]tream bank stabilization and erosion control that
reduces bioload sediment, (2) filtering and entrapment of
sediments and silt, (3) stability against stream damage by
high-flow events, (4) ground-water recharge through absorption, (5) shade to maintain stream temperatures suitable for aquatic resources, (6) organic debris that enters
the aquatic food chain, and (7) overhanging bank cover
from tree roots and shrubs that provide cover and terrestrial insect food for fish.28
In addition, the streamside forest is a principal source of
instream nutrients servicing the rangeland ecological community.29 Particularly in arid climates, riparian ecosystems
are essential in maintaining the delicate natural balance, as
they provide shelter and sustenance for a wide variety of
wildlife.3 °

25. Id. Scientifically, "riparian ecosystem" is defined as: "wetland ecosystems that have a high water table because of proximity to an aquatic system or
surface water." Id. A "riparian zone" is defined as "the strip of land bordering
surface waters whose vegetation depends on a high water table." Id. A "riparian area" generally describes "any area with riparian qualities." Id. For purposes of this comment, the terms are used interchangeably.
26. See Jon M. Skovlin, Impacts of Grazing on Wetlands and Riparian
Habitat: A Review of Our Knowledge, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR RANGELAND MANAGEMENT 1004, 1085 (1984).
27. See ED CHANEY ET AL., LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON WESTERN RIPARIAN AREAS

2 (1990).

28. Richard H. Braun, Emerging Limits on FederalLand Management Discretion: Livestock, RiparianEcosystems, and Clean Water Law, 17 ENVTL. L. 43,
46-47 (1986) (citing from WESTERN Div., AM. FISHERIES Soc'Y, MANAGEMENT
AND PROTECTION OF WESTERN RIPARIAN STREAM ECOSYSTEMS 6, 6 (1980)).
29. Skovlin, supra note 26, at 1002-04.
30. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 94-95. "Riparian areas provide avenues
and cover for animal movements and migrations, assuring wide distribution,
minimum species inbreeding, and refuge from humans and their developments." Id. at 94.
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Effect of Livestock Grazing on RiparianAreas

Riparian zones cover less than 1% of western federal
lands, 3 1 but they provide 81% of the forage consumed by livestock.3 2 The determinative sources of the widespread environmental damage on federal rangelands are general over33
grazing and livestock grazing on delicate riparian areas.
Grazing practices, in fact, have resulted in the mass destruc3 4 As much as
tion of riparian ecosystems on public lands.
35
90% of public lands have been polluted by grazing practices.
Environmental damage results because left alone, cattle
will consume all available vegetation in the riparian area
first.3 6 Due to the abundance of vegetation within a riparian
ecosystem, as well as its aquatic nature, cattle tend to graze
and remain in these areas. 37 In the higher mountainous regions, riparian areas around small streams and lakes are especially sensitive to long-term debasement because of the
31. CHANEY, supra note 27, at 2.
32. Douglas M. Green and J. Boone Kauffman, Nutrient Cycling at the
Land-Water Interface: The Importance of the RiparianZone, in PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO RIPARIAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL WORKSHOP
61-68 (1989) (cited in JACOBS, supra note 10, at 95).

33. See Beverly I. Strassmann, Effects of Cattle Grazing and Haying on
Wildlife Conservation at National Wildlife Refuges in the United States, 11
ENVTL. MGMT. 35, 39-40 (1987).
34. A 1993 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency report found that "riparian areas throughout the west were in the worst condition in history" due to
improper grazing management. CHANEY, supra note 27, at 5-6. By some estimates, "perhaps only 10 percent of the original riparian habitat of the United
States remains today" and "about 6 percent of this amount continues to be lost
annually." Skovlin, supra note 26, at 1008-09. Another ecologist estimates
"70%of the West managed for ranching the vast majority of riparian areas have
been and are being significantly damaged by livestock." JACOBS, supra note 10,
at 95. The Arizona Game & Fish Department has reported that "97% of the
state's original riparian habitat has been lost, with ranching the major factor."
Id. at 99 (citing George Wuerthner, The Price is Wrong, SIERRA, Sept.-Oct. 1990,
at 38-40).
35. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 107.
Experts estimate that 90% of the surface water on public land is
significantly polluted. In the West, sediments loosed by livestock, pollutants washed off the overgrazed land, manure, urine, and dead cattle
are the main sources of water pollution in most ranching areas (which,
again, compose 70% of the West), as well as many downstream
waterways.
Id.
36. Id. at 95.
37. Id. Once cattle find a suitable area, "they stay indefinitely unless
strongly induced to move." Id.
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harsh climate, thin soil and low stream sediment levels.3" In
the lower riparian zones, defoliation decreases fertile bottomland soil. 3 9 Moreover, simultaneously, water turbidity and

the amount of harmful pollutants, sediments and debris in
the water flow is increased. 40 Because plant life helps to trap
water and keep the soil fertile, the absence of foliage creates a
barren floodplain, resulting in the extermination of nearby
plants, loss of groundwater, and reduction in the diversity of
animal habitat.41
The impact of livestock grazing on fish habitats is also
severe. Generally, most reports "show that heavy or uncontrolled grazing degrades habitat for fish."42 Overgrazing has
as "the single greatest menace to
been cited by one authority
3
4
trout streams today."

Further, loss of vegetation results in increased sediment
in water sources, which is harmful to aquatic wildlife and
downstream fisheries. 44 Manure, urine and dead cattle carcasses are deposited into water sources, contributing to the
spread of diseases such as salmonella, dysentery, and
giardia. 45 The result is extensive pollution of federal waters.
3. Restoration of RiparianAreas
Despite a long history of documented abuse, some studies
strongly suggest that riparian ecosystems have a high restor38. Id. at 96.
39. Id.
40. The riparian vegetation acts as a sieve. It sucks up water for storage
and strains sediments washed down from the highlands. CHANEY, supra note
27, at 42. Sediments form into a fertile bottom layer of top soil. Id. When the
vegetation is removed, the water flows downhill unimpeded, especially during
rainy season, carrying excess water, topsoil, and other surrounding particles
into larger bodies of water. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 96-97. The speed of the
water creates a steeper, narrow gorge through which water is funneled, thus
contributing to the overall destruction of riparian areas. See Strassman, supra
note 33, at 39-40.
41. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 96-97.
42. Skovlin, supra note 26, at 1040-41.
43. Noel Rosetta, Herds,Herds on the Range, SIERRA, Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 43,
45-46.
44. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 107.
45. Id. at 108-10. Cattle produce approximately 50 lbs. of excrement a day,
which, among other elements, contains large amounts of ammonia, nitrates, sodium, phosphates, and potassium. Id. at 108. In addition, cattle also displace
20 lbs. of urine, also high in ammonia, which has been shown to be hazardous to
humans and toxic to fish. Id.
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ative capacity.4" Restoration would improve water quality as
47
well as provide relief for the abused rangeland habitats.
Experimental fencing of damaged riparian ecosystems has
yielded successful regrowth of normal native plant species,
improvement in the filtering capacity of riparian zones, and
decreased water turbidity.4 8 However, some dispute does exist as to the efficiency and effectiveness of natural recovery
methods.4 9
In 1988, at the request of the Chair of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, the U.S. General Accounting Office [hereinafter GAO] 50 conducted its own analy1 The
sis of rangeland management of riparian areas.
purpose of the report was to identify specific examples of the
restorative capability of riparian systems, evaluate damage,
and develop grazing techniques which would minimize impact on the riparian areas. 52 The GAO concluded that several grazing techniques were available to alleviate the effects
of livestock grazing on riparian areas, but that the most effective method was simply to reduce or eliminate grazing in
those areas.53
4. Assessing the Damage
In completing its report on the condition of riparian areas on public lands, the GAO experienced resistance from
both grazing permitees and the BLM when investigating specific rangelands. 54 The GAO's eventual assessment of riparian area degradation, given the partial information available, was that there are "tens of thousands of miles of
riparian areas in the West, with only a small portion of them
46. See HAROLD F. HEADY
MANAGEMENT 454 (1994).
47. See JACOBS, supra note

& R.

DENNIS CHILD, RANGELAND, ECOLOGY &

10, at 90-93.
48. Id.
49. Braun, supra note 28, at 50. In expressing concern over who will bear
the restorative costs, ranchers often question whether livestock actually damage riparian areas at all. Id.
50. The General Accounting Office is an executive agency charged with reviewing, regulating, and proposing fiscal management policies for federal administrative agencies and programs. See generally FREDERICK C. MOSHER, THE

GAO: THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN AMERICAN
51. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.

GOVERNMENT

(1979).

52. Id. at 2.
53. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 99-101 (citing GAO REPORT, supra note 3).
54. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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in good condition."5 5 Moreover, the GAO determined that

"[p]oorly managed livestock grazing is the major cause of degraded riparian habitat on federal rangelands."5
The BLM admits that considerable riparian degradation
exists and, as a consequence, it has developed management
and restorative practices which it contends will alleviate the
problem.57 However, agency efforts have been piecemeal and
inadequate in comparison to the amount of sites in need of
restoration.58 In addition, these programs do not address the
between the bovine presence and
incompatible relationship
59
viability.
area
riparian
The problem of grazing and the law of rangeland management are in need of urgent reform. As one author has
stated: "no other land use is so destructive in so many
ways." 60 In addition to the decimation of riparian ecosys-

tems, a myriad of other environmental ills stem from grazing
on public lands. 6 1 For example, desertification and flooding
are two problems linked to livestock grazing. 62 Unfortunately, there is no federal statute that sufficiently "scrutinizes" agency activity to make sure the rangeland is being
managed efficiently.
B. Regulation of FederalRangelands
Federal regulation of the public rangeland was slow in
developing and inconsistent in application. 63 Laws and administrative agencies were designed principally to assist the
grazing industry in its exploitation of public lands.64 Only in
55. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 96.

56. Id.
57. BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 9. Less conservative estimates compiled
by other sources believe a much greater percentage of all riparian areas on public lands have been degraded. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

58. GAO

REPORT,

supra note 3, at 3.

59. See BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 13-14.

60. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 33. However, the BLM maintains that the
public "rangelands are in better condition now than at any time in this century." BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.
61. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 33.

62. See Rosetta, supra note 43, at 47 (estimating that overgrazing has
helped put about 10% of U.S. land in a state of severe or very severe desertification); see also William H. Schlesinger et al., Biological Feedbacks in Global
Desertification,SCIENCE, Mar. 2, 1990, at 1043 (describing the biological effect
and impact livestock have on removing topsoil and creating desert).
63. See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
64. See Coggins I, supra note 7, at 536.
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recent years have attempts been made to manage the public
65
range in an ecologically responsible manner.
1.

Historical Development of Rangeland Management

Federal rangeland management has historically been
66 The livestock incontrolled by powerful ranching interests.
dustry's power encompassed both political and economic control.6 7 Using whatever means were necessary, the ranchers
68
essentially "claimed" dominion over the federal range.
a.

The Early Years

Livestock grazing was an established profession long
69 Before 1934, the
before federal regulation was instituted.
public range was essentially a commons, characterized by
"ranching wars," "land grabs," and chronic overgrazing. 70 In
1884, the estimated cattle population in 17 western states
as high as 35-40 million, as "forage fever" swept the
reached
7'
West.
In 1905, Congress "set aside forest reserves from the unreserved public domain."7 2 The Forest Service promulgated
grazing regulations and for the first time charged a nominal
grazing fee of 20 to 35 cents per cow during the summer season. 73 However, the agency was heavily influenced in its pol65. See infra notes 127-44 and accompanying text.
66. See Coggins I, supra note 7, at 536.
67. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 13.
68. Id. Given that the ranchers had "great numbers of livestock and control
of huge amounts of land and crucial sources of precious water-and with a willingness to use violence to get what they wanted-they banded together to form
what is known today as the livestock grazing industry." Id. Oftentimes, local
livestock associations established their own industry regulations. EVERETT
DALE, THE

RANGE CATTLE INDUSTRY: RANCHING ON THE GREAT PLAINS FROM

1865 TO 1925, at 58 (1960). Eventually, "there gradually grew up in the range
cattle area a body of precedents, customs, and principles, the whole forming a
kind of unwritten law of the range as 'cow custom' which was in force and
respected throughout the region." Id. This is still going on today. See, e.g., Ed
Marston, Rocks and Hard Places, WILDERNESS, Spring 1991, at 38-45.
69. WILLIAM VOIGT, JR., PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS: USE AND MISUSE BY INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT 17-19 (1976).
70. Id. at 27-30.
71. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 11.
72. WILLIAM D. ROWLEY, U.S. FOREST SERVICE
HISTORY 4 (1985).
73. Id. at 55-60.

GRAZING AND RANGELANDS:

A
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icy formulation by ranching interests.7 4 Agency infiltration
continued as "[a] great many ranchers became district, forest,
regional, and national Forest Service range and administrative officials." 75 The subsequent regulatory agency established by the Taylor Grazing Act was appropriately termed

the "Division of Grazing."76 It was later reorganized into the
Grazing 7Service, only to be controlled by ranching interests
as well.

7

b.

The Bureau of Land Management

In 1946, the General Land Office 7 and the Grazing Serreorganized to create the Bureau of Land Manage8
0
ment. The BLM is charged with the administration of 269
8
million acres, or about 41%, of all federally owned land. '
Most of the land under BLM's exclusive jurisdiction is arid
and semi-arid land, property that was not "grabbed" during
the "century of western land disposition."8 2 In the western
United States, 177 million acres, or 24% of eleven western
s3 Of this land, 163 million
states, are managed by the BLM.
84
acres are used for ranching.
vice7"

74.

PHILLIP 0. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING

60 (1960).
75. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 17.
76. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text. See also JACOBS, supra

ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

note 10, at 17;

WESLEY CALEF, PRIVATE GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS: STUDIES OF
LOCAL MANAGEMENT OF THE TAYLOR GRAZING ACT 76 (1960).
77. See PAUL J. CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE ON THE FOREST SERVICE AND THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 86

(1981); see also JACOBS, supra note 10, at 18.
78. The General Land Office was the first federal agency responsible for
managing public lands. See CULHANE, supra note 77, at 75.
79. The Grazing Service, originally named the Division of Grazing, existed
as an independent division of the Department of Interior. See CALEF, supra
note 76, at 76-77.
80. 11 Fed. Reg. 7876 (1946)
81. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS 1 (1992). For purposes of this comment, "federal lands" and
"public lands" are synonymous.
82. See Coggins I, supra note 7, at 536, 541-47.
83. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 568. The "western United States" consists of:
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, Washington and Wyoming. Id.
84. Id. The permitees who use this acreage represent only 2% of the total
livestock industry. Id. at 25. Surprisingly, only 3% of all beef produced each
year in the U.S. grazes on public lands. Id. at 27. Thus, an enormous amount
of public land, and money, is spent to subsidize a small portion of all livestock
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The administrative reformation of the General Land Office and the Grazing Service did not translate into reform of
rangeland management. The historical "vassal" relationship
of federal rangeland management agencies to powerful
85
Special interest "disranching interests remained intact.

trict advisory boards," made up exclusively of ranchers,
strongly influenced BLM policy and rules, especially on the
vital issue of grazing lease levels. 86 In effect, "the Forest Service and BLM... functioned more as grazing industry tools
than true regulatory agencies. "87 It has been only within the
last twenty years, as public interest in "rangeland management law" has increased, that the BLM's actions have been
scrutinized. 8

Even today, however, the BLM is considered

by many to be "ineffectual and often downright subservient to
the users it is supposed to regulate."8 9
In 1987, the BLM produced an agency policy statement
90
regarding the management of riparian areas. The report
acknowledged the destructive capacity livestock grazing can
have on sensitive riparian environments and called, if implemented, for planning to "maintain, restore, or improve" riparian zone "values."91 However, because the report was only a
"policy" it was distinguished from a BLM regulation and
therefore did not require compliance with a specific management plan.92
There have been more recent attempts to manage riparian areas. The BLM's 1991 annual report makes reference
to a document entitled "Riparian-WetlandInitiatives for the
1990's."93 The BLM considers these initiatives to be "a
blueprint for managing riparian-wetlands" which "stresses a
holistic watershed management approach with participation
on an interdisciplinary, cooperative basis" while emphasizing
"management of the natural recovery process prior to considfood producers, who account for a negligible amount of American beef! Id. at
25-30.
85. See CULHANE, supra note 77, at 89-91.
86. Id.
87. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 19.
88. See Coggins I, supra note 7, at 536-37.
89. Id. at 552.
90. See Braun, supra note 28, at 66.
91. Id.
92. Id. (noting that the policy binds the BLM only to the extent that the
BLM chooses to be bound).
93. BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
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ering structural measures."94 The BLM has set goals and
specified degraded riparian areas it intends to restore.9 5
However, restoration will be only "used to show the multiple
benefits of improving riparian areas."96 Therefore, livestock
grazing will continue in riparian zones, defiling them even as
they are being restored. 7
2.

The BLM's Statutory Authority
a. The Taylor Grazing Act

The BLM's statutory authority was developed under the
auspices of ranching interest influence. The Taylor Grazing
Act of 193498 was instituted to protect vested grazing interests against nomadic herding encroachment, as well as to recognize officially the grazing industry.9 9 The significant provisions of 1the Taylor Act include: establishment of permit
systems, 00 grazing fees charged for use of federal lands, 10 1
and organization of grazing advisory boards. 10 2 In practice,
the Taylor Act served as a legal tool used by ranching interests to fortify their "rights" to the public range. 10 3 Not surprisingly, environmental concerns, such as determination of
the "carrying capacity" of livestock on public lands, were continually neglected after the passage of the Act,' 0 4 even
94. Id.
95. Id. The BLM estimates there are 500,000 acres of riparian-wetland
habitat under its jurisdiction. Of this, 174,000 miles of riparian areas are
targeted for restoration. Id.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
98. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1982).
99. See CALEF, supra note 76, at 52. The Taylor Grazing Act was instituted
by and named after Representative Edward Taylor, a Colorado rancher who
was a staunch proponent of ranching interests and "sworn enemy of conservationists." JACOBS, supra note 10, at 17; see also VOIGT, supra note 69, at 249-50.
Besides stabilizing the ranching industry, the Act was also designed to restore
damaged public lands, and to develop a system of leases and grazing fees for
established ranchers. Coggins I, supra note 7, at 547. In addition, the Act created the Division of Grazing (later the Grazing Service) to implement the
scheme. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 17-18.
100. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1982).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 315(f).
103. Coggins I, supra note 7, at 550-52.
104. See id. at 552.
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though the Act provided for protection of the rangeland
through regulation.' 015
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act
and the Public Rangeland Improvement
Act
In 1976 and 1978, Congress finally produced much
needed revisions in the law, which contain sufficient author10 6
The Federal
ity to alleviate environmental concerns.
10 7
is essentially the BLM's
Management Act
Land Policy and
"organic act." 10 FLPMA does not repeal the Taylor Grazing
09
Act, but instead is superimposed upon it.1 In FLPMA's first
section, "[c]ongress declares that ... management be on the
basis of multiple use and sustained yield" and that "the public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of . . . ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric,
0
water resource, and archeological values.""
The legislative intent behind FLPMA may be characterized in five broad principles: "(a) planning must precede and
control specific allocation decisions; (b) multiple use, sustained yield must be implemented as the basic management
standards; (c) environmental values must be protected; (d)
public participation must be encouraged; and (e) the legislature must continue to oversee public land management and
disposition.""' The concept of multiple use remains central
to FLPMA. 1 2 The term evinces a method of management
b.

105. The Taylor Grazing Act states that: "The Secretary of the Interior shall
make provision for the protection, administration, regulation, and improvement
of such grazing districts as may be created... and he shall make such rules and
regulations... to regulate their occupancy and use, to preserve the land and its
" 43 U.S.C. § 315(a)
resources from destruction or unnecessary injury ....
(1982).
106. See infra notes 107-22 and accompanying text.
107. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1976) [hereinafter FLPMA].
108. Coggins I, supra note 7, at 555. The BLM, which was established by the
reorganization of two executive administrative agencies, never had formal legislative authority under which agency action could be based. Id. For the first
time, FLPMA provided the BLM with official recognition and a directed mission. Id. at 555-56.
109. See Coggins I, supra note 7, at 555-57 (discussing the effects that
FLPMA will have on the future public rangeland management by the BLM).
110. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7),(8) (1976).
111. George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland IV: FLPMA, PRIA,
and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (1983) [hereinafter Coggins

IV].

112. Id. at 32.
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that seeks to extract a manifold of benefits from available
while retaining long-term quantity and
natural resources
3
quality.

11

The BLM has been slow to comply with FLPMA's multiple use mandate.

114

Rather than use FLPMA to develop

much needed rangeland management reform, the BLM has
been unable to develop coherent, focused programs using the
multiple use principles. 1 15 Officials in the BLM have treated
FLPMA as an abstract statement of general policy, rather
than as a vehicle for meaningful reform." 6 As a result,
"rangeland management remains but a pale shadow of what
it ought to be."" 7
The latest legislative action which addressed rangeland
management was the Public Rangeland Improvement Act of
1978 [hereinafter PRIA]."1 S Once again, instead of giving
concrete guidance to the BLM on how to implement the legislature's intent, PRIA meanders on about the precarious state
of the federal range. PRIA begins by declaring "vast segments of the public rangelands are producing less than their
113. "Multiple use" is formally defined as:
the management of the public lands and their various resource values
so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the
present and future needs of the American people; making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources or related services over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic
adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and conditions; the
use of some land for less than all of the resources; a combination of
balanced and diverse resource uses that takes into account the longterm needs of future generations for renewable and nonrenewable resources, including, but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural and scenic, scientific and
historical values; and harmonious and coordinated management of the
various resources without permanent impairment of the productivity
of the land and the quality of the environment with consideration being given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily to
the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or
the greatest unit output.
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1976).
114. Coggins I, supra note 7, at 556-57; see also Braun, supra note 28, at 60
n.51 (quoting Behan, Multiple Use Management: Kudos and Caveats, in NATIONAL

RESEARCH

COUNCIIJNATIONAL

ACADEMY

OF

SCIENCES

DEVELOPING

STRATEGIES FOR RANGELAND MANAGEMENT 1001, 1991, 1997 (1984)).

115. See George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management, in
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCHINATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES DEVELOPING
STRATEGIES FOR RANGELAND MANAGEMENT 1901, 1914 (1984).

116. Id.
117. See Coggins, supra note 115, at 1914.
118. 43 U.S.C. § 1901-1908 (1979).
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potential for livestock, wildlife habitat, recreation, forage,
and water and soil conservation benefits, and for that reason
are in an unsatisfactory condition." 1 9 From there, the Act
120
and esprovides appropriations for improvement projects
12 1
PRIA
Although
tablishes a new grazing fee formula.
clearly signals Congress' desire for improvement of rangeland
conditions, the BLM has yet to implement this part of the
Act. 12 2

The BLM's broad discretionary power under FLPMA and
PRIA is illustrated by the seminal rangeland management
1 23
In Hocase, National Resources Defense Council v. Hodel.
with
comply
to
BLM
the
force
to
suit
brought
del, the plaintiff
livestock
reducing
by
the mandates of PRIA and FLPMA
grazing that had caused excessive and unnecessary degradation of public rangelands.124 Even though the court admitted
that livestock reduction would be "environmentally preferable, or might even be closer to what Congress had in mind,
the district court made it plain that 'the courts are not at liberty to break the tie choosing one theory of range management as superior to another.' "125 The court reasoned that the
forceful policy expressed in PRIA and FLPMA cannot "be con-

2 6 Thus, Hosidered concrete limits upon agency discretion."'

del clearly evidences the vast discretion of the BLM in determining rangeland management programs under current
applicable federal legislation.
3. Rangeland Reform '94

The most recent attempt to reform rangeland administration was embodied in "Rangeland Reform '94," the Clinton
administration's proposed general policy on public land management. 2 7 The program was first espoused in 1993, and
119. Id. § 1901(a)(1).
120. Id. § 1904.
121. Id. § 1905.
122. See Coggins I, supra note 7, at 557.
123. 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985).
124. Id. at 1056-58.
125. Id. at 1058 (quoting Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 807 (1979)).
126. Id. at 1058.
127. The BLM's notice of proposed rulemaking formally defines Rangeland
Reform '94 as:
a proposal developed by the Department of the Interior through the
BLM, in close cooperation with the U.S. Department of Agriculture
and the FS (Forest Service), for effecting fundamental policy changes,
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emphasized increasing grazing fees as its hallmark of sweep128
ing range reforms.
Under the leadership of the Secretary of the Interior,
Bruce Babbitt, the BLM proposed policies and regulations
that would have dramatically affected grazing practices on
public lands. 12 9 Rangeland Reform '94 sought to address the
problems associated with rangeeconomic and environmental
13 0
land management.
In August 1993, the Department of the Interior officially
gave notice of its intent to reformulate grazing fees and
rangeland management regulations. 1 3 1 There were three
major shifts in policy and rules in the proposed regulations
that would have significantly changed rangeland administration. Politically, the most contentious change was the increase in grazing fees from $1.86 per animal unit month to an
eventual price of $3.96 per animal unit month, an 113% increase.' 32 The rise in grazing fees would have reduced the
indirect subsidization the livestock grazing industry reincluding adjustment of the Federal grazing fee, in its rangeland management program. The intent of the proposed changes is to make the
BLM's rangeland management program more compatible with ecosystem management, to accelerate restoration and improvement of public
rangelands, to obtain for the public fair and reasonable compensation
for the grazing of livestock on public lands, and to streamline certain
administrative functions.
Grazing Administration Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208 (1993) (to be codified
at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, and 4100) (proposed Aug. 13, 1993).
128. Tom Kenworthy, U.S. to Tighten GrazingRules, Increase Fees on Public
Lands, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1993, at Al.
129. See generally Grazing Administration Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208,
43,209 (1993) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, and 4100) (proposed Aug.
13, 1993) (proposing changes to rangeland management in the following areas:
Grazing Advisory Boards, National Rangeland Standards and Guidelines, Permit or Lease Tenure, Subleasing, Affected Interest Status, Conservation Use,
Forage Allocation, Unauthorized Use, Full Force and Effect Decisions, Suspended Non-Use, Disqualification, Prohibited Acts, Ownership of Range Improvements, and Water Rights). The Secretary of the Interior has been strongly
involved in advocating the proposed regulations, stating: "The Clinton-Gore Administration has delivered on its promise to reform grazing policy." U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR, ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCES SWEEPING RANGE REFORMS;
GRAZING FEES WILL MOVE CLOSER TO MARKET RATES (1993).

130. Grazing Administration Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208 (1993) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, and 4100) (proposed Aug. 13, 1993).
131. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCES SWEEPING
RANGE REFORMS; GRAZING FEES WILL MOVE CLOSER TO MARKET RATES (1993).
132. Grazing Administration Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,203, 43,217-19 (to
be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, and 4100) (proposed Aug. 13, 1993). For a
definition of animal unit month, see supra note 10.

19951

COWS IN HOT WATER

1285

ceives, 13 3 not to mention slightly reducing the overall amount
of cattle on public lands by forcing some ranchers out of business. In addition, Grazing Advisory Boards and District Advisory Councils would have been replaced by Resource Advisory Councils, which were to be composed of a variety of
interest group representatives including ranchers, environ4
mentalists, business owners, and others.'1 Unlike previous
advisory councils, the expanded Resource Advisory Councils
decisions. 13
would have provided diverse input into BLM
Lastly, the proposal included several revisions to BLM regulations focused on encouraging ecologically responsible use
and management. 1 36 Land use policies were to be overhauled
37
to promote ecologically stable ranching.1 The regulatory
program was designed to reward ranchers who manage their
livestock in an ecologically responsible manner, while penalizing those who do not, thus potentially lessening the detricaused by environmentally insensitive
ment to public lands
13
grazing practices.
Before the rules were approved, however, they were absorbed into an Interior Department spending bill and em9
broiled in a political battle.' 3 The bill, if passed, would have
slightly reduced the proposed increase in grazing fees, but
40
would have retained all the other operational regulations.
Moreover, legislative recognition would have legitimized sub133. The enduring debate over grazing fees is consistently turbulent. The
federal grazing fee set for ranchers is still well below market value, as evidenced by corresponding grazing fees charged for use of private lands. Lynn
Ludlow, Underpayments by Overgrazers,S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 16, 1993, at A12.
The average fee for grazing on private lands in 11 Western states is $10.03/
animal unit month, whereas the current BLM fee is $1.86. Id. But see John S.
Nalivka, Why the Debate and Who Will Benefit, 72 W. LIVESTOCK J. 12, 12
(1993) (arguing that the federal grazing fee does not reflect other costs of grazing unlike a private grazing fee).
134. Grazing Administration Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,208, 43,220-21
(1993) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, and 4100) (proposed Aug. 13,
1993).
135. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
136. See Grazing Administration Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,203, 43,21013 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, and 4100) (proposed Aug. 13, 1993).
137. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCES SWEEPING
RANGE REFORMS; GRAZING FEES WILL MOVE CLOSER TO MARKET RATES (1993).
138. Id.
139. Melissa Healy, Lawmakers OK Plan To Double U.S. Grazing Fees, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at A3; Raising Grazing Fees, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 14,
1993, at B6.
140. Id.
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sequent reform efforts against potentially adverse influences. 14 1 Consequently, when the bill reached the Senate, it
was met by a fierce western Republican filibuster. 14 2 The
blockage continued in Congress until the House finally
stripped the grazing fee and rangeland management provisions from the bill. 143 Ultimately, Secretary Babbitt abandoned his plans to increase grazing fees. 144
C.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
1.

Brief Overview of the Clean Water Act

The avowed purpose of the Clean Water Act is to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters."1 4 5 In order to achieve these ends,
Congress provided that "programs for the control of nonpoint
sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of this chapter to
be met through the control of both point and nonpoint sources
of pollution." 4 6 The key regulatory provision of the Clean
Water Act states: "[e]xcept in compliance with this section
of any pollutant by any person
and sections... the 4discharge
7
unlawful."
shall be
141. See infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
142. Senate Foes Hold Up Boost In GrazingFees, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 22, 1993,
at A9.
143. Senate Lets Babbitt Decide Grazing Policy, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 1993,
at A7.
144. See Tom Kenworthy, Proposal to Raise Grazing Fees is Sinking Slowly
in the West, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1995, at A23. Amazingly, the new grazing
fees are actually going down-by 19%! See id.
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). More specifically, the Clean Water Act
sought to eliminate effluent pollution discharge into navigable waters by 1985.
Id. § 1251(a)(1).
146. Id. § 1251(a)(7).
147. Id. The exceptions referred to in the provision set up the basic regulatory mechanisms of the Clean Water Act. They include: 1) Technology-based
effluent limitations, regulatory standards developed by the Environmental Protection Agency based upon relative levels of technological feasibility. Id.
§ 1311(b). 2) Water quality related effluent limitations, which allow for stricter
limitations to meet ambient goals for a particular body of water. Id. § 1312. 3)
New source performance standards, which set stringent standards for new or
modified pollution sources. Id. § 1316. 4) Toxic and pretreatment effluent standards, that limit toxic pollutants and secretions into sewage plants. Id. § 1317.
5) The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, an elaborate permit
system which enforces, organizes and regulates water polluting sources. Id.
§ 1342. 6) Lastly, permits for dredged or fill material, which regulates discharge of these materials. Id. § 1344.
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In the regulatory universe of the Clean Water Act, all
sources of pollution are classified as either "point" or
"nonpoint." A "point source of pollution" is defined by the
Clean Water Act as: "any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, vessel
or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged." 14 8 For example, a pipe spewing wastes into a
body of water is a "classic" point source.
Although the term "nonpoint" is referred to in several
provisions throughout the Clean Water Act, nowhere in the
Act is it specifically defined.' 4 9 The EPA describes nonpoint
pollution as wastes "caused by diffuse sources that are not
regulated as point sources and [which are] normally associated with agricultural, silvilcultural, and urban runoff, runoff
from construction activities, etc."1 50 Nonpoint pollution also
commonly results from runoff from mining, landfills, and livestock production. 1 5 1 Simply stated, a nonpoint source is anything that is not a point source.15 2 Thus, virtually any activ148. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988). "Agricultural stormwater discharges" and
"irrigation return flows" are specifically exempted from the definition of point
source. Id.
149. Congress provided that "programs for the control of nonpoint sources of
pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of this chapter to be met through the control of both point and
nonpoint sources of pollution." Id. § 1251(a)(7). In addition, nonpoint sources
are referred to in sections including, but not limited to, sections 1251, 1288,
1313(e), 1314(f), 1315(b), 1324, and 1329. Apparently, Congress felt that the
character of nonpoint sources was sufficiently vague and amorphous as to
render any attempt to define the term futile.
150. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NONPOINT SOURCE GUIDANCE
3 (1987).
151. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).
152. 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: AIR AND WATER 146

(1986) (describing a "nonpoint source" as: "any source of water pollution or pollutants not associated with a discrete conveyance"). There are as many different definitions of "nonpoint" as there are types of nonpoint pollution. Nonpoint
sources of pollution may be defined as "any source that is not a point source
and may, with some exceptions, be roughly analogized to the common law's 'diffused surface waters,' comprised mostly of runoff from land." John H. Davidson, Thinking About Nonpoint Sources of Water Pollution and South Dakota
Agriculture, 34 S.D. L. REV. 20, 21 (1989). Another authority defines nonpoint
source as "surface water runoff carr[ying] a variety of pollutants that impair
water quality." Daniel R. Mandelker, ControllingNonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can it be Done? 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 479 (1989). Wisconsin, which

has incorporated the definition of nonpoint into statutory law, describes
nonpoint as "a land management activity which contributes to runoff, seepage
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ity that produces pollution not channeled through a discrete
conveyance may be a nonpoint source.
2.

Regulation of Nonpoint Sources under the Clean
Water Act

Regulation of nonpoint sources involves a combination of
technological and land use controls. Because land use is
often linked to difficult political, social and economic choices,
Congress reasoned that the most logical solution to this
pressing and critical dilemma was to avoid making a deciis addressed by two prosion. 153 Nonpoint source legislation
54
visions of the Clean Water Act.1
a. Section 208
Congress officially acknowledged the nonpoint pollution
55
problem in the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act.1
However, the solution was somewhat divergent from pre-existing effluent emissions and ambient water quality standards found in other parts of the Act. 156
Under section 208, state and local agencies must develop
planning provisions for both point and nonpoint pollution
sources under a general "[a]reawide waste treatment management" plan. 5 7 The planning process is commenced by the
Governor of each state, with the aid of local governments,
designating substantially polluted areas and agencies responsible for areawide planning. 158 Planning provisions
should complement effluent limitation programs by producing regulations that take into consideration unique local
circumstances. 159
or percolation which adversely affects or threatens the quality of waters of this
state and which is not a point source...." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.25(2)(b) (West
1989).
153. See infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 155-86 and accompanying text.
155. Robert D. Fentress, Nonpoint Source Pollution, Groundwater, and the
1987 Water Quality Act: Section 208 Revisited?, 19 ENVTL. L. 807, 816 (1989).
156. Id. at 816-17.
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1990).
158. Id. § 1288(a)(2). If the Governor fails to designate affected areas and
responsible agencies, local governments may specify sub-standard waters and
representative organizations to develop an areawide waste management plan.
Id. § 1288(a)(4).
159. Id. § 1288(b). In addition to the areawide waste treatment management plan, the Clean Water Act emphasizes planning in other sections. The
National Pollutant Prevention Discharge Elimination System program requires
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The Clean Water Act requires the areawide waste management plan to include "identification of the measures necessary to carry out the plan."1 60 Nonpoint sources are regulated under state water quality management plans that
identify "agriculturally and silviculturally related nonpoint
sources of pollution, including return flows from irrigated agriculture, and their cumulative effects, runoff from manure
disposal areas, and from land used for livestock and crop production, and.., set forth procedures and methods (including
land use requirements) to control to the extent feasible such
16
sources." 1
Specifically, agencies must set forth a detailed "management strategy" or series of regulatory techniques, considering
economic and social factors, in order to alleviate land uses
that contribute to pollution levels above pre-established
water quality standards. 1 6 2 Owners and operators of rural
lands may enter into contracts with the federal government
to pay for implementation of "best management practices"
[hereinafter BMPs] for nonpoint pollution control programs. 1 6 3 Grants are available to pay for up to 75% of the
planning process.' 64 To conclude the process, the EPA apwhich is superimposed into the section
proves the 1plan,
65
plan.
303(e)
BMPs are "control measure[s] for slowing, retaining or
absorbing pollutants produced by the surface water runoff associated with nonpoint sources."166 "Detention ponds" and
a "continuing planning process" before permits can be issued. Id. § 1313(e).
River pollution control planning is to be produced "for all basins in the United
States." Id. § 1289(a).
160. Id. § 1288(b)(1)(B),(2)(E).
161. Id. § 1288(b)(2)(F).
162. Id. § 1288(b)(2)(F)-(H).
163. The 1977 Amendments to the Clean Water Act established the Rural
Clean Water Program, which includes economic incentives for rural land owners to control nonpoint source pollution. Id. § 12880).
164. Id. § 1288(f).
165. Id. § 1288(b)(4).
166. Mandelker, supra note 152, at 483. "Best Management Practices" are
defined by the EPA as:
Methods, measures or practices selected by an agency to meet its
nonpoint source control needs. BMPs include but are not limited to
structural and nonstructural controls and operation and maintenance
procedures. BMPs can be applied before, during and after pollutionproducing activities to reduce or eliminate the introduction of pollutants into receiving waters.
40 C.F.R. § 130.2(1) (1988).
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"infiltration trenches" are examples of BMPs used to control
nonpoint pollution.1" 7
A BMP is roughly equivalent to an effluent emissions
standard, 168 such as "best available technology," with two notable distinctions. First, it is not clear if BMPs are technology-forcing. Depending upon the interpretation, a BMP may
be "everything from control within the physical limits of possibility to control if convenient for the affected industry."16 9
Thus, regulators face considerable ambiguity in determining
the precise nature of a BMP. In practice, however, most
BMPs are designed considering the physical locality, costs,
and benefits of nonpoint pollution abatement.170 Second,
BMPs are practices that constitute "the most effective and
practicable means for preventing or reducing pollution generated by a nonpoint source."'

71

They do not establish regula-

tory standards or "acceptable" pollution levels.' 72 However,
water quality standards, when used in conjunction with
BMPs, can "provide an objective legal basis for controlling
nonpoint pollution."173

b.

Section 319

Fifteen years after the introduction of the section 208
program, Congress amended the Clean Water Act to address
specifically the problem of nonpoint source pollution.' 74 The
1987 amendments, referred to by Congress as the Water
Quality Act, clearly express that the new nonpoint pollution
75
control program must be effectively and quickly developed.'
167. Mandelker, supra note 152, at 483. Other examples of BMPs found in
EPA regulations include: "schedules of activities, prohibitions of practices,
maintenance procedures, . . .treatment requirements, operating procedures,
and practices to control plant site runoff, spillage or leaks, sludge or waste disposal, or drainage from raw material storage." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1987).
168. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1988).
169. RODGERS, supra note 152, at 329.
170. Mandelker, supra note 152, at 483.
171. HEADY & CHILD, supra note 46, at 461.
172. See Braun, supra note 28, at 73.
173. Id. at 74. EPA policy calls for states to design BMPs to achieve water
quality standards. Id. at 72 n.94. Water quality standards are ambient standards set by each state pertaining to individual bodies of water. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313 (1988).
174. 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1988).
175. Id. § 1251(a)(7). When debating the merits of the Water Quality Act,
Senator Baucus remarked: "the real value of this legislation is the new provision representing a renewed commitment to the cleanup of nonpoint sources of
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Under section 319, the Governor of each state must produce a "state assessment report" 176 and a "state management
program." 17 7 The assessment report identifies waters that

will not achieve or maintain state water quality standards
178 In addition, the aswithout additional control measures.
sessment report must indicate "particular nonpoint sources
which add significant pollution" exceeding existing water
quality standards for navigable waters. 179 Lastly, the assessment report must "describe[ ] the process ... for identifying
best management practices." 180 The EPA then must approve
the assessment report. 81 If a state fails to submit an assessment report, either a local administrative agency may dethe EPA has auvelop one for its own area, or alternatively
182
independently.
one
produce
to
thority
Whereas the assessment report ascertains the nature
and extent of nonpoint source pollution, the state management program sets out a regulatory program for controlling
nonpoint pollution. 18 3 The report must specify best manage-

ment practices that detail the strategy to achieve the desired
water.18 4
water quality standards for a particular body of
The state management program must also identify procedures to implement the BMPs, schedules of implementation,
and sources of financial assistance. 185 If the EPA does not
approve the state management program, or the state fails to
complete one, local public organizations or agencies with

pollution and establishing a national policy that programs for the control of
nonpoint sources of pollution be implemented." 133 CONG. REC. S744 (daily ed.
Jan. 14, 1987) (statement of Sen. Baucus). Senator Baucus is also a co-sponsor
of the 1993 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act. See infra note 294 and
accompanying text.
176. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1) (1988).
177. Id. § 1329(b).
178. Id. § 1329(a)(1)(A).
179. Id. § 1329(a)(1)(B).
180. Id. § 1329(a)(1)(C).
181. Id. § 1329(a)(1). The EPA also approves the state management program. Id. § 1329(b)(1).
182. See id. § 1329(d)(3), (e).
183. Id. § 1329(b)(1).
184. Id. § 1329(b)(2)(A).
185. Id. § 1329(b)(2)(A)-(C).

1292

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

nonpoint pollution regulation expertise may develop the pollution control program.1 8
3. Distinguishingsection 319 from section 208
As may be evident from an initial reading, the distinction
between the regulatory tools provided by sections 208 and
319 is far from drastic. In many aspects, section 319 is simply a more poignant, yet equally "toothless," section 208.187
There are, however, a few notable differences.
With respect to the identification, implementation and
encouragement of nonpoint source pollution regulation, Congress made several programmatic revisions. First, section
319 requires that specific navigable bodies of water that are
threatened by nonpoint source pollution be identified,"8 8
whereas section 208 only required identification of nonpoint
sources in general.'8 9 Second, unlike section 208, section 319
instructs states to consider the impact of best management
practices on groundwater quality. 190 Third, section 319 plans
must include a schedule for implementation of the regulatory
process. 91 Fourth, under section 319 states must report to
the Administrator concerning timely completion of regulatory
schedules.' 9 2 The Administrator then reports directly to the
Congress on all progress made in reducing nonpoint source
93
pollution.1
Section 319 also includes $400 million in grants over a
four-year period to assist states in implementing their approved management plans. 1 94 In order to renew grants, state
reports to the Administrator must show "satisfactory progress" towards fulfilling the regulatory schedule. 95 In contrast, Section 208 does not condition renewal of grants on a
186. Id. § 1329(e). The EPA may assist the local agencies with technical expertise. Id. Section 208 has a similar provision with respect to producing areawide waste management plans. Id. § 1314(a)(4).
187. See infra notes 273-86 and accompanying text.
188. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(A), (B) (1988).
189. Id. § 1288(b)(2)(F)-(H).
190. Id. § 1329(b)(2)(A).
191. Id. § 1329(b)(2)(C).
192. Id. § 1329(h)(11).
193. Id. § 1329(m)(1). Under section 208, ultimate supervision was conducted by the EPA, not Congress. Id. § 1288(b)(4)(D).
194. Id. § 1329(h)(3).
195. Id. § 1329(h)(8).
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by the states of satisfactory use of federal
demonstration
96

funds.

1

Lastly, the EPA has authority to develop its own assessment report under section 319.197 However, under both sections 319 and 208, the EPA may not produce a management
program independently. 198
4. Determinationof Whether a Source is Point or
Nonpoint
Whether a source is point or nonpoint will have significant repercussions in determining the regulatory provisions
which would apply to a particular polluting activity. Point
sources of pollution are generally regulated by technologybased effluent standards, essentially requiring generators of
effluent waste emissions to reduce their discharge of specific
pollutants to pre-established levels, specified in their permits, using varying levels of available technology to achieve
the required rates. 199 Nonpoint regulation is essentially left
to the will of the states or, in absence of state action, the governing administrative agency.' °°
Occasionally, a nonpoint source will be regulated as a
point source. This usually occurs when an adequate waste
gathering mechanism exists that would allow for the normal
20 1 In
point source regulatory process to be carried out.
United States v. Earth Sciences,"' a gold leaching facility in
Colorado operated by Earth Sciences produced pollution as a
result of spraying cyanide over gold ore so that gold could be
extracted from the ore.203 The excess cyanide was drained
into a sump.20

4

During a warm spring, a nearby blanket of

196. Id. § 1288(f).
197. Id. § 1329(d)(3).
198. Fentress, supra note 155, at 818, 825.
199. Id. §§ 1311, 1342. The principal levels of technology employed are classified as "best practicable technology," "best conventional technology," and "best
available technology economically achievable," Id. § 1314(b)(4)(B).
200. See supra notes 157-65, 176-86 and accompanying text.
201. For example, a discrete conveyance from which pollution samples could
be taken, from which emissions could be calculated, and which could be regulated under the NPDES permit program.
202. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
203. Id. at 370.
204. Id. A "sump" is "a pit for draining, collecting, or storing liquids." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1426 (2d ed. 1976).
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snow melted causing the sump to overflow, and washing cyanide into the Rito Seco Creek below.2" 5
The EPA brought suit, alleging three separate instances
of effluent standard violations under the Clean Water Act.20 6
As a point source, the EPA identified a ditch through which
the cyanide polluted water ran that could serve as a discrete
conveyance for monitoring pollution levels.20 v The court held
that although the facility was not a classic point source, it
would contravene "the intent of the FWPCA [Clean Water
Act] and the structure of the statute to exempt from regulation any activity that emits pollution from an identifiable
point." 20 0 The court reasoned that the pollution could be regulated much like point sources, and that the legislative history of the Clean Water Act supported their conclusion.20 9
One year later in Sierra Club v. Abston Construction
Co.,210 the Fifth Circuit held that a coal mining operation
could be regulated as a point source. In Abston, runoff from
rain and water draining resulted in excess silt and acid deposits in nearby streams. Although the court acknowledged
that some mining operations were nonpoint sources, the facility in this case was considered a point source. 21 1 The court
explained that "[s]imple erosion over the material surface, resulting in the discharge of water and other materials into
navigable waters, does not constitute a point source discharge, absent some effort to change the surface, to direct the
waterflow or otherwise impede its progress."2 12 It did not
matter that the channeling action resulting in waste discharge was not put in place by the coal mining operation "so
long as they are reasonably likely to be the means by which
pollutants are ultimately deposited into a navigable body of
water."

2 13

The Water Quality Act directly limited the impact of the
United States v. Earth Sciences2 14 line of cases. First, "agri205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 370.
Id. at 371.
United States v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 373.
Id.
620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 43.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 45.
599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
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cultural stormwater discharges" were specifically excluded
from the definition of point source.215 Second, section 402
prevented the Administrator from issuing a permit to regulate "discharges of stormwater runoff from mining operations
or oil and gas exploration . . . composed entirely of flows
which are from conveyances .-. . used for collecting and con-

veying precipitation runoff and which are not contaminated
by contact with ...

waste products located on the site of the

operation. "216 As a result, stormwater runoff from agriculture and runoff from mining or oil and gas operations, have
17
been exempted from permitting requirements.2
However, the Earth Sciences rationale may still be applicable in other contexts, including livestock grazing. A recent
2 18
case on point is Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, in which
a coalition of concerned citizens sued to enjoin discharge of
raw sewage which had been pouring from a housing development into the Sakonnet River since 1969.219 The court analyzed the definition of "point source," ultimately concluding
that "[1]iability must lie with the person or persons causing
the 'addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.' "220 The
court's decision was based on prior case law that "broadly interpreted the definition of point source to reach all pollution
2 21 The appropriate rethat comes from a confined system."

medial action was to require the dischargers to obtain a
permit.222

215. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988).
216. Id. § 1342()(2). "Stormwater" regulation is a related concept to
nonpoint source pollution, but is addressed separately by the Clean Water Act.
See id. § 1342(p). The general rule with respect to stormwater is that prior to
October 1, 1994, permits are not required for discharges composed entirely of
stormwater. Id. § 1342(p)(1). However, there are several exceptions. Permits
are required for stormwater discharges associated with industrial activity, municipal separate storm sewers serving a population of more than 100,000, or
any discharge the Administrator deems is violating water quality standards.
Id. § 1342(p)(2). After October 1, 1994, permits will be mandatory for
stormwater discharge. See id. § 1342(p)(1).
217. Id. § 1342()(2).
218. 738 F. Supp. 623 (D.R.I. 1990).
219. Id. at 626.
220. Id. at 630.
221. Id. at 629.
222. Id. at 631, 632.
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ANALYSIS

A. The State of the Range
1. Focusing in on Reality
All interests agree that public range and riparian areas
are continually deteriorating. Environmentalists and some
public interest groups contend that riparian areas have endured massive destruction since the 1800s. 223 The General
Land Office report on the state of the range stated: "80% of
the 1,036 miles inventoried were in poor or fair condition. "224
Clearly, a serious problem exists on America's public rangelands. However, the exact extent of deterioration remains
still unclear.
2. Inadequacy of RiparianArea Restoration Policies
Studies have substantially proven that riparian areas
can recover if livestock are prevented from grazing in the vicinity.225 Ranching interests who deny the detrimental effect
of riparian area grazing, basing their conclusions on experience, are contradicted by the BLM's own riparian management policy. 2 26 In its report on restoring riparian areas, the

GAO determined that it was possible, given ideal circumstances, for restoration of riparian areas to be accomplished
by changing grazing techniques. 227 One alternative is protective measures which would entail construction of fences, isolated watering units, and drainage ditches. 228 In many cases,
development of these devices could be prohibitively
expensive.229
The GAO's own report suggests, however, that the best
riparian zone recovery occurred when livestock were excluded
or reduced in the area. 230 Clearly, this would be the simplest
and safest protective policy.
223. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 99; Skovlin, supra note 26, at 1008-09.
224. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 48. See also Braun, supra note 28, at

68.
225. CHANEY, supra note 27, at 12, 17.

226. BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
227. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 99-100 (citing GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at

53).
228. Id. at 54-57.
229. Braun, supra note 28, at 50 n.16.
230. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 99-100 (citing GAO REPORT, supra note 3,
at 53).
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Riparian area protection policies which allow contemporaneous restoration and grazing practices will continue to re23 1 The consistent
sult in incomplete riparian area recovery.
error in government agency restoration policies is the belief
that livestock grazing and healthy riparian areas can coexist,
when the bulk of the agency's own investigations strongly
suggest that they cannot.
Livestock prohibition from riparian areas is needed to
save the public rangeland. The scarce forage and water resources present in riparian areas, however, serve as a vital
23 2 Denying ranchers access to
element of livestock grazing.
these zones would result in increased costs borne out in construction of new watering structures and decreases in the
233
number of cattle grazing upon the range.
Limitations on the Existing Regulatory Framework
Despite a history of administrative resistance and indifference to environmentally responsible rangeland management, recent executive activity germinated hope that significant improvement in the environmental stability of BLM
2 3 4 Unfortunately, recent relands would be forthcoming.
23 5 Although the BLM has
forms were never consummated.
23 6
recognized that a problem does exist, remedial administrative action is limited in effectiveness. As a result, change in
public land stewardship via the administrative process
presents an arduous and uncertain endeavor.
B.

1.

PoliticalPressures

The transitory nature of administrative regulations is
2 3 7 Political difficulties insusceptible to political pressures.
herent in the rulemaking process are illustrated by the institutional conflicts that have characterized the current reform
process.2 3 8 The intense political debate over Rangeland Reform '94, which pitted maintenance of environmental quality
against economic concerns, will not fade into oblivion.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
CHANEY, supra note 27, at 6; Skovlin, supra note 26, at 1004.
Braun, supra note 28, at 50 n.16.
See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
GARY LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE RANGE 9 (1981).
See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
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In addition to outside political forces, bureaucratic resistance to agency reform has become an anticipated administrative response. 2 39 After all, the BLM:
is one of the least known and most parochial organs of the
federal establishment. Underfunded, understaffed, and
without an effective constituency, it proclaims the best of
intentions but refuses to stand up to opposition by the major rangeland users. It was conceived in politics of the
worst kind, brought up to believe that accommodation ouand is undergoing the
tranks science or professionalism,
240
age.
middle
ineffectual
of
crisis
Hence, fleeting political rewards, limitations in resource allocation from legislators, and bureaucratic entrenchment all
contribute to agency ineffectiveness.
2.

Misdirected Reforms

FLPMA and PRIA vest the BLM with the authority to
manage the public rangelands. 2 4 1 Except for a few scattered
sections, however, rangeland management is mainly a matter
of discretion.2 4 2 As Hodel demonstrated,2 43 the concept of
multiple use has been generally regarded as a broad policy
orientation, devoid of substantive requirements.2 4 4
It was hoped that the Rangeland Reform '94 program
would have eased the burden on damaged federal lands.
However, even assuming the proposals were eventually implemented, Rangeland Reform '94 never directly addressed
the crucial issue of excessive livestock grazing on the public
range.2 4 5
Furthermore, Rangeland Reform '94 proposed imposing
negative and positive reinforcements on ranchers in order to
improve environmental quality.2 4 6 While these measures
make perfect political sense, it is uncertain to what extent
they would have been successful, because their success de239. See Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructinga Law of
Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 300 (1994).
240. Coggins I, supra note 7, at 87.
241. See BLM REPORT, supra note 5, at 2; see also Braun, supra note 28, at
62-63.
242. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
244. Coggins IV, supra note 111, at 19-20.
245. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
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pended upon the grazing industry's response. Certainly the
potential existed for environmental degradation to be reduced, but the time frame and scope of reforms were difficult
to assess. Merely restructuring management policy and increasing grazing fees may not have sufficiently reduced cattle
grazing in an amount necessary to allow the public rangeland
to recover. In addition, the possibility remained that the reforms would be completely ineffective. In comparison, direct
reform based on statutory authority, which does not rely on a
reactionary ranching industry, retains a greater measure of
247
certainty in its effectiveness.
Even if the BLM has undergone a major policy overhaul,
the damage to the public rangeland, and especially to sensiin
tive riparian ecosystems, can best be abated by a reduction 248
the amount of livestock allowed to graze on public lands.
The report of the General Accounting Office on the status2 4of9
riparian areas on federal land supports this proposition.
To protect riparian areas and effectively maintain the public
range, grazing should be directly reduced or prohibited on
federal lands.
C. Applicability of the Clean Water Act to Rangeland
Management
1. RiparianArea Regulation as a Vehicle for Change
BLM management of public rangelands is subject to the
2 50 As a reconstraints of federal law as required by FLPMA.
sult, the management of riparian areas is unique in that it
requires the regulating agency comply not only with assorted
federal rangeland laws, but also with the mandates of the
Clean Water Act.2 51 Thus, the riparian area, which serves as
247. See infra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
248. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 99-100. This is not to downplay the potential for success of a program like Rangeland Reform '94. If properly implemented, Rangeland Reform '94 could have significantly reduced environmental
degradation. Nothing from past or present experience, however, suggests that
the agency or the ranching industry will cooperate. See supra notes 114-17,
239-40 and accompanying text.
249. Id. (citing GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 48).
250. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(C)(8) (1982). The BLM must also act in compliance
will all applicable state laws. Id.
251. The relevant section reads:
Each... agency... of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction
over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or
which may result, in the discharge or runoff of pollutants,.., shall be
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the heart of the rangeland ecosystem, may also serve as a vehicle for rangeland reform via the applicable regulatory provisions of the Clean Water Act.
The Clean Water Act seeks to "maintain the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."2 5 2
Water affected by livestock grazing mostly likely falls under
the rubric of Clean Water Act regulation, since "Congress intended to regulate discharges made into every creek, stream,
river or body of water that in any way may affect interstate
commerce."2 53 Moreover, the Clean Water Act specifically recognizes the need for protection of waters associated with
"land used for livestock" in its nonpoint regulatory
program.2 5 4
The uncertainty involved in determining the pollution
source "status" of livestock grazing under the Clean Water
Act merits application of both point and nonpoint source
analyses. Each management program has inherent benefits
and drawbacks.2 5 5
2.

Regulation of Livestock Grazing as a Point Source

While pollution caused by livestock grazing is most properly considered nonpoint,2 5 6 supplemental environmental factors may exist which would allow for the normal point source
regulatory procedures to be used. 25 7 The rationale behind
this inexact regulatory method is evident in the Earth Sciences line of authority.2 58 In United States v. Earth Sciences,259 the emphasis was on the existence of an adequate
"gathering mechanism," in this case a "sump," which served
to justify application of the standard point source regulatory
subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water pollution.
33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1990). See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
252. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1990).
253. See United States v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1979).
254. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F) (1990).
255. Potential solutions are addressed in section V. See discussion infra part
V.
256. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
257. See infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 201-22 and accompanying text.
259. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
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tools. 2 60 Despite the admitted fact that the actual source of
pollution was not "confined or discrete," 26 1 and thus by statu-

tory definition was not a "point source,"262 the existence of
polluted federal waters influenced the court to set aside statutory discrepancies in favor of protecting valuable water resources.263 However, effluent emission standards have not
been imposed in subsequent cases involving similar "gathering mechanisms."2 64
Oftentimes, cattle congregate in a limited segment along
a protected watercourse that has been left unprotected.265
These "water gaps" are sacrifice areas where the concentration of water pollutants is normally excessive.266 Potentially,
effluent limitations based on the monitoring of water taken
from water gaps could be established and a permit system
implemented to regulate livestock grazing near those water
sources.
Satisfactory gathering mechanisms which would make
regulation possible, however, must first be identified.
Whether a particular riparian area or individual water gap
would fit the required description is unclear.2 67 Riparian areas that have established water gaps could be considered as
possible pollution sources capable of being regulated as a
point source.268
Unfortunately, other riparian zones do not have adequate circumstances sufficient to consider regulation on a
point source basis. Many riparian zones are sensitive arid
260. Id. at 374. The standard regulatory tools are effluent limitations and
permits. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
261. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373.
262. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
263. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373.
264. See, e.g., Hudson River Fisherman's Ass'n v. County of Westchester, 686
F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (refusing to determine, without an evidentiary hearing, that an adjunct drainage ditch next to a landfill could act as a
satisfactory point source in order to enforce effluent standards).
265. See Braun, supra note 28, at 71 n.88. The riparian area is fenced in, but
a gap is left open for cattle to water themselves. Id.
266. Id.
267. As previously discussed, riparian areas come in a variety of forms. See
supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
268. In June 1994, an environmental coalition brought suit claiming that
federal grazing permits fall under the jurisdiction of section 401 the Clean
Water Act. See Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA) (Jan. 26, 1995) available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Curnws File. If successful, federal grazing permits would be
subject to a variety of CWA regulatory mechanisms, including effluent limitations and water quality standards. Id.
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meadow ecosystems, where monitoring would be impracticable.2 69 In some instances, no pre-existing gathering mechanism is apparent, rendering moot any type of point source
regulation. Thus, while regulation of livestock grazing in the
standard Clean Water Act point source program may successfully restore some areas, other damaged areas would not be
protected by such a program.
In attempting to formulate a large-scale regulatory program, it is desirable that as broad a spectrum of pollution
sources as possible is covered. Regulation of nonpoint sources
as point sources is dubious and has questionable practicality
because the overall program probably will not be uniform.
3. Regulation of Livestock Grazing as a Nonpoint
Source
Nonpoint regulation has two key advantages over a comparable point source program. First, regulation of grazing
through a nonpoint source system involves a comprehensive
approach which can regulate all public lands, in contrast to
the selective approach of a point source program.2 7 ° Second,
nonpoint regulation does not require special extrinsic elements needed for the point source regulatory process.2 7 1
Regulation of livestock grazing also falls more comfortathe category of nonpoint source pollution regulation.
into
bly
This is because pollution produced as a result of livestock
grazing does not originate at any one discrete conveyance,
2 72
but is actually a result of an inadequate land use policy.
An areawide waste management plan which specifically
deals with livestock grazing appears ideal. There are, however, several limitations inherent in the nonpoint regulatory
program that render this form of regulation superficial.
a. Failures of Section 208
As might be expected, there are a number of problems
with the practical implementation of section 208. First, "the
short time frame allowed for the planning process, erratic
269. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 94 (describing the various types of riparian
zones).
270. See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 202-09 and accompanying text.
272. The Clean Water Act addresses pollution caused by livestock as a land
use problem to be regulated as a nonpoint source. Cf 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F)
(1990).
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federal funding, and lack of adequate data," create intergovernmental conflicts at the regional level. 3 States resent federal control, regional agencies resent state control, and local
governments resent regional control.274 This cycle of regulatory power conflicts, coupled with statutory inadequacies, results in inefficient and ineffective development and implementation of the areawide waste management programs.
Second, the EPA does not have the authority to develop
its own areawide waste management plan if it rejects a state
plan.275 In addition, while the EPA may propose methods of
nonpoint pollution regulation, it may not enforce those regulations. 6 Thus, the EPA's role in the program includes
making suggestions and stamping approval of state plans.
States have the authority to decide what plan will be devel-

2 77 As one author
oped and whether they will enforce it.

noted: "[t]he primary reason that section 208 is not taken se-

riously by most states is because they don't have to ...With-

out some substantial encouragement by federal carrots or
sticks, state governments are naturally going to shy away
from such tasks."278
b. Failuresof Section 319
Many commentators point to lack of sufficient enforcement provisions in section 319 as the critical weak point of
279 Section 319
the nonpoint source management program.
does not require states to submit either an assessment report
273. See

ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY

384 (1990). For a detailed analysis of barriers impeding state and local efforts
to control nonpoint pollution, see UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

WATER POLLUTION: GREATER EPA LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO REDUCE NONPOINT

SOURCE POLLUTION (Oct. 1990).

274. ANDERSON, supra note 273, at 384.
275. The EPA's limited ability to affect areawide management plans includes
rejection of the state's plan or withdrawal of EPA approval of the plan. 33
U.S.C. § 1288(b)(4)(D) (1990). In addition, the EPA may withhold grants for
public works not in conformity with the plan. Id. § 1288(d).
276. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
277. Davidson, supra note 152, at 43-44.
278. 2 J. BATTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, WATER POLLUTION AND HAZARDOUS
WASTE 215 (1986) (emphasis in original) quoted in Robert D. Fentress,
Nonpoint Source Pollution, Groundwater,and the 1987 Water Quality Act: Section 208 Revisited?, 19 ENVTL. L. 807, 822 (1989).
279. See Mandelker, supra note 152, at 486; see also Fentress, supra note
155, at 825.
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or a management program. 280 Although the Administrator
28
has the authority to develop a limited assessment report, '
the EPA may not produce a management program to effectuate the assessment report. 28 2 While the assessment report
identifies nonpoint sources, the management program requires deciding difficult and multifarious land use choices,
and thus is the most important practical element of section
3 19.281 3 Furthermore, although local expert agencies may develop their own management program if the state fails to produce one, in practice this rarely occurs because local organi28 4
zations resist making divisive land use modifications.
Under section 319, the EPA has no authority to force
28 5
states to clean up identified sources of nonpoint pollution.
States are left to their own devices in determining whether
2 8 6 Voluntary
they will enforce the management program.
state action on controversial issues requires national commitment. Section 319 fails to provide states with adequate guidance, support, and disincentives to enforce their nonpoint
source management programs.
c.

Politicaland Economic Factors

Land use often entails difficult social, political, and economic choices which local governments have traditionally decided, and in which the federal government has been reluctant to interfere.28 7 Recent legislative proposals of funds for
national nonpoint source regulation range from 230 to 500
million dollars.2 88 Moreover, the modification of land use
practices affects the way people live and work. Drastic
changes in favor of environmental control are resisted due to
28 9 Local governments
concerns over their economic impact.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Davidson, supra note 152, at 44.
33 U.S.C. § 1329(d)(3) (1990).
Id.
See supra notes 176-86 and accompanying text.
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.

285. Section 309, the standard enforcement section of the Clean Water Act,
does not apply to nonpoint sources. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1990).
286. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.

287. James C. Buresh, State and FederalLand Use Regulation: An Application to Groundwaterand Nonpoint Source Pollution Control, 95 YALE L.J. 1433,

1433 (1986).
288. Clean Water Bills Focus on Nonpoint Pollution, Toxic MATERIAL NEws,
July 28, 1993 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS file.
289. See Mandelker, supra note 152, at 490.
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often share similar concerns and are even more apt to ignore
expensive regulation of pollution that will most likely, eventually, end up in another jurisdiction.2 9 °
There is a conspicuous absence of meaningful enforcement of nonpoint regulation.2 9 ' Problems associated with
livestock grazing are not unknown to the federal government.
Recent legislative action shows that there are influential
forces working both sides of the grazing issue.2 9 2 Congress
has not yet been willing to take a stand, nor to force the
states to decide. The end result of the legislative deadlock is
that the task falls upon the Bureau of Land Management, an
agency whose attitude towards rangeland management reform is suspect.2 9 3
IV.

PROPOSAL

The water pollution and rangeland degradation stemming from livestock grazing give rise to a series of challenging and controversial issues. However, the condition of the
public range is deplorable and the need for rangeland management reform urgent. It is time to address the problem of
livestock before it is too late.
Given recent developments, it appears that nonpoint
source pollution regulation will be revamped through a series
of amendments to the Clean Water Act. 2 94 A major part of
these new laws should directly address the problem of livestock grazing on public rangelands. Legislative recognition of
livestock grazing as a type of nonpoint source pollution will
not only help to legitimize the movement for reform, but will
also assist in any subsequent judicial inquiries regarding the
issue.
New amendments to the Clean Water Act should place
responsibility and accountability for creation and implemen290. Id. at 489-90.
291. See supra notes 275-78, 285 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 80-89, 114-17, 236-40 and accompanying text.
294. New nonpoint legislation may be promulgated if the Clean Water Act is
reauthorized. The "Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1993
(WPPCA)," was introduced into Congress on June 15, 1993. See S. 1114, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Nonpoint source pollution has been a major issue in the
congressional debate. See Key CWA Reauthorization Players Gearing Up for
Hill Battle in 1994, AIR WATER POLLUTION REPORT, Dec. 6, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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tation of new nonpoint regulatory programs with the states.
Penalties, deadlines, and enforcement provisions must be escan no longer defer resolution of
tablished so that states
2 95
issues.
use
land
these
The new amendments should not only make nonpoint
regulation of livestock grazing a mandatory obligation, but
should also provide adequate guidelines for states in carrying
out Congress' intent.2 9 6 General guidance for nonpoint programs regarding livestock grazing should be provided. First,
water quality standards for riparian zones must be set by the
states and approved by the EPA. Subsequently, the states
should identify "best management practices" reflecting best
economically feasible technology to achieve acceptable water
quality standards. An essential element in developing best
management practices is to discard the notion that range2 9 7 Thus,
lands can coexist with massive livestock intrusions.
295. While the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act purports to force
state action, see S. 1114 § 304(a)(1)(c)(amending 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1990)), there
are several "loopholes." First, states have seven years to review and revise
their plans after the Act becomes law. Id. Second, upon a showing of "economic
incapability," a polluter will be exempted from management program standards
and the enforcement provisions. Id. § 304(a)(1)(E) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1329
(1990)).
296. The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act attempts to address
this need. Within 30 months of enactment of the bill, all states must revise
their management programs to specify their phased management strategy for
existing and new nonpoint sources of pollution, identify all targeted or priority
watersheds, establish an implementation schedule, and develop a process for
determining nonpoint source pollutant load reductions, critical sites, and BMPs
for targeted watersheds. S. 1114 § 304(a)(6) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1329
(1990)).
Unlike under the existing nonpoint source regulatory legislation, if a state
fails to submit a revised management program, or if the Administrator does not
approve the plan, the EPA must develop its own enforceable nonpoint management programs. Id. § 304(a)(5)(A)-(B) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1990)).
To assist the states, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency is required to produce the "National Guidance Program (NGP)." S. 1114 § 304(c)
(amending 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1990)). The National Guidance Program will include descriptions of nonpoint source categories and subcategories, appropriate
implementation criteria and management measures for use in evaluating state
programs, methods to estimate pollutant load reductions to protect and promote water quality, and monitoring techniques for control of nonpoint sources.
Id. However, to provide added flexibility for states in developing control measures, regional administrative agencies may adopt site-specific plans that reflect
local concerns as an alternative to federal management measures. Id. § 304(0
(amending 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1990)). The hope is that states will have an objective basis on which to develop their management programs in order to receive
federal grants.
297. See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
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management programsmust include reduction of livestock on
2 98 responsible
federal lands to ecologically and economically
levels. Happily, in the case of livestock grazing, these two
299
objectives are not mutually exclusive.
Second, states should be encouraged to isolate and develop "gathering mechanisms" in applicable areas, so that effluent limitations, monitoring data, and a permitting program can be readily established. 30 0 Although this approach
does not address all sources of nonpoint pollution, the potential benefits in riparian area restoration make these reforms
reasonable. Such reforms have the additional benefit of immediate impact.3 1
The administrative role should also be clearly defined.
The EPA should be required to develop applicable BMPs
when states fail to take the initiative. The BLM should be
responsible for implementing these procedures, through both
revision of grazing techniques, as well as increases in base
grazing fees.
The recent debate over grazing fees, Rangeland Reform
'94, and the untenable quality of public lands signal impending change. The revision of nonpoint source pollution management plans proposed in this comment does not attempt to
restore the public range to its original pristine state, but
30 2
merely to encourage the conservation of the public range.
V.

CONCLUSION

Currently, livestock grazing is the largest single cause of
degradation to public lands. The public rangeland cannot
sustain the extraordinary number of livestock currently grazing on it without severe ecological repercussions. Most livestock congregate in riparian areas. They are often the
298. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
301. Of course, with or without new Clean Water Act amendments, the path
of judicial supervision is clear for potential degraded federal waters that fall
within the Earth Sciences parameters. See supra note 268 and accompanying
text.

302. "Conservationism" is a natural resource use philosophy that seeks to
maximize beneficial uses of the environment for as long a term as possible. See
generally SAMUEL

P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE

PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890-1920 (1959) (describing the his-

torical development and philosophical content of the conservationist

movement).
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lushest and most fertile areas on the range, as well as vital
elements of the rangeland ecosystem. They are also easily
damaged. Livestock tend to overgraze in these areas, resulting in water pollution, soil degradation, wildlife habitat destruction, and other associated ecological ills. Management
devices aimed at reducing the burden on riparian areas have
been successful primarily when livestock are prevented from
grazing in those areas.
Historically, the BLM, the agency responsible for managing the public rangelands, has shown little interest in maintaining the biological integrity of riparian areas. Given the
failure of recent reform efforts, it is uncertain whether the
administrative regulatory revisions will overcome political
pressures.
The solution could lie in regulation of riparian areas on
public land through the Clean Water Act. Pollution caused
by livestock grazing is usually characterized as "nonpoint."
Nonpoint wastes are not ejected from a discrete and measurable conveyance, but are instead carried into regulated waters
by runoff. Pollution of this type has commonly been regulated by two methods. The first seeks to apply a permitting
program to sources of nonpoint pollution if normal point
source structures exist that would facilitate regulation. The
drawback of this method is that not all riparian areas on federal rangelands qualify, thus resulting in sporadic regulation.
The second regulatory method constructs areawide land use
plans to manage all pollution caused by nonpoint sources.
Unfortunately, lack of federal statutory authority has allowed states to circumvent successful reform.
Ultimately, the key elements that should be extracted
from both regulatory programs are development of particular
water quality standards for riparian areas, best management
practices featuring reduced numbers of livestock on federal
rangelands, and initial development of regulatory devices in
accessible riparian areas. Overarching these reforms is the
need for government accountability in areawide waste treatment plan development. If the public rangeland is to be conserved, policy revision using the nonpoint source pollution
provisions of the Clean Water Act offers a cogent and promising solution to the problem of rangeland degradation.
Brian L. Frank

